We study stochastic static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers, with the goal of obtaining (globally) optimal policies under a decentralized information structure. We present sufficient conditions to connect the concepts of team optimality and person by person optimality for static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers. We show that under uniform integrability and uniform convergence conditions, an optimal policy for static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers can be established as a limit of a sequence of optimal policies for static teams with N decision makers as N → ∞. Under the presence of a symmetry condition, we relax the conditions and this leads to optimality results for a large class of mean-field optimal team problems where the existing results have been limited to person-by-person-optimality and not global optimality (under strict decentralization). Our contribution here, to our knowledge, is the first global optimality (and not only person-by-person-optimality) result for mean-field team problems under the strict decentralization of information (that is, with no information sharing). We also introduce an existence result on optimal solutions for mean field teams. We consider a number of illustrative examples where the theory is applied to setups with either infinitely many decision makers or an infinite-horizon stochastic control problem reduced to a static team.
former are shown to be ǫ-equilibria for the latter [20, 37, 9] . These results, while very useful for establishing the equilibrium or in the context of team problems, person-by-person-optimal policies, does not guarantee the ǫ-global optimality among all policies. That is, ǫ-person-byperson-optimality is not sufficient for ǫ-global optimality; since in the limit one typically only finds equilibrium policies without establishing their uniqueness (which would imply global optimality for team problems) [32, 38] .
Related to such problems, in the economic theory literature, [38, 32] , have considered Cournot-Nash equilibria, where in a non-cooperative game each player responds to infinitely many players through their (expected empirical) distribution and since players have identical utilities and an individual player is macroscopically negligible (hence the name anonymous games is also used for such setups), equilibrium solutions are established under possibly randomized strategies. This Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept corresponds to a mean-field equilibrium for a static problem (we note that similar results for stationary equilibria have been established for non-cooperative stochastic dynamic games with decision makers interacting through distributions [25] ). However, such an equilibrium does not necessarily imply global optimality in the context of team problems, as discussed above.
Recently, mean-field team problems have also been studied: Social optima for meanfield LQG control problems under both centralized and restricted decentralized information structure have been considered in [22, 40] . In [1] , a setup is considered where the decision makers share some information on the mean field in the system, and through showing that the performance of a corresponding centralized system can be attained under a restricted decentralized information structure, global optimality is established. The papers [24, 23] have studied a continuous-time setup where a major agent is present; by considering the social impact for each individual player, they showed person by person optimal policies asymptotically minimize the social cost [22] . By approximating the mean field term, the authors bound the induced approximation error of order O(N −1 2 + ǫ N ) where ǫ N goes to zero as the number of players N → ∞ [22] . In [7] , mixed players mean-field team problems have been considered where minor agents act together to minimize a common cost against a major player. Such results on mean-field teams either show global optimality through equivalence to the performance of a centralized setup (considering specific sharing patterns on the mean-field model) or typically only assume person-by-person-optimality. In our paper, we will establish global optimality under a completely decentralized information structure; however, certain technical conditions will be imposed.
Connections with the literature on limits of finite player games/teams. There exist contributions where games with finitely many players are studied, their equilibrium solutions are obtained and the limit is taken. Along this direction, the connection between Nash equilibrium of symmetric N -player games and an optimal solution of mean field games has been addressed in [4, 14, 15, 6, 2, 27] . The goal is to find sufficient conditions such that the limit point of the sequence of Nash equilibrium for the N -player games identifies as a solution of the corresponding mean field game as N → ∞. Convergence of Nash equilibria of symmetric N -player games to the corresponding mean field games for stationary continuous-time problems with ergodic costs has been investigated in [4, 14] . Moreover, such a convergence of Nash equilibria for symmetric N -player games to the corresponding mean field solution for a broad class of continuous time symmetric games has been established in [15] under a uniform integrability and exchangeability (symmetry) conditions (see [15, Theorem 5 .1 and conditions (T) and (S)]) provided that the cost function and dynamics admit the structural restrictions. Using a concentration of measures argument, it has been shown in [15] that, a sequence of ǫ N -local (for each player) Nash equilibria for the N player game converges to a solution for the mean field game under exchangablity of the initial states of the dynamics and weak convergence of normalized occupational measures [15, Theorem 5.1] . In [27] , assumptions on equilibruim policies of the large population mean field symmetric stochastic differential games have been relaxed to allow the convergence of asymmetric approximate Nash equilibria to a weak solution of the mean field game [27, Theorem 2.6 ]. In a discretetime setup, [6] considered convergence of Nash equilibria for games with the mean field interaction and with ergodic costs for Markov processes. The convergence result has been derived under an existence assumption on the mean field solution and an additional convexity condition (see [6, Theorem 5 .1 and condition (A7)]). In contrast, in the context of stochastic teams with countably infinite number of decision makers, the gap between person by person optimality (Nash equilibrium in the game-theoretic context) and global team optimality is significant since a perturbation of finitely many policies fails to deviate the value of the expected cost, thus person by person optimality is a weak condition for such a setup, and hence the results presented in the aforementioned papers may be inconclusive regarding global optimality of the limit equilibrium. This observation motivates us to investigate the connection between person by person optimality and global team optimality in stochastic teams with countably infinite decision makers. Compared with [4, 14, 15, 6, 2] where only the convergence of a sequence of Nash equilibria for symmetric games with the mean field interaction has been studied, we show that, under sufficient conditions, a sequence of optimal policies for teams with N number of decision makers as N → ∞ converges to a team optimal policy for the static team with countably infinite number of decision makers.
Connections with the literature on LQG games/teams. There has been a number of studies focusing on the LQG setup (in addition to [22, 40] ). A close study is [30] where LQG static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers have been studied and conditions for global optimality have been established. In our paper, we utilize some of the results from [30] , however compared with [30] , we propose sufficient conditions for team optimality on average cost problems for a very general setup: except convexity, no specific structure is presumed a priori on the cost function. For our analysis, we do not restrict the setup to the LQG one, where often direct methods can be applied building on [35] , [26] , and operator theory involving matrix algebra; in addition we also study the mean-field setting. For a general setup of static teams, we introduce sufficient conditions (see Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3) such that the optimal cost and optimal policies of static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers is obtained as a limit of the optimal cost and optimal polices for static teams with N number of decision makers as N → ∞. In [16] , LQG team problems with infinitely many decision makers have been considered for a setup where the cost function is the expected inner-product of an infinite dimensional vector (and to allow for a Hilbert theoretic formulation, finiteness of the infinite sum of the moments of individual random variables is imposed) and linearity and uniqueness of optimal policies have been established; the finiteness (of the infinite summation) restriction rules out the setup in our paper. In [34] , infinite horizon decentralized stochastic control problems containing a remote controller and a collection of local controllers dealing with linear models have been addressed for a setup where the cost is quadratic and the communication model satisfies a specified sharing pattern of information between local controller and remote controller. Under the assumed sharing pattern (common information), the connections between the optimal solution and the coupled algebraic Riccati equation for Markov jump linear systems and its convergence to the coupled fixed point equations have been utilized to show the optimality of the solution [34] .
As a further motivation for our study, we note that for dynamic team problems, Ho and Chu [19] have introduced a technique such that dynamic quasi-classical LQG team problems can be reduced to static team problems (we also note that Witsenhausen [41] showed also that under an absolute continuity condition, any sequential dynamic team can be reduced to a static one). For infinite-horizon dynamic team problems, this reduction leads to a static team with countably many decision makers; thus leading to a different setup where our results in this paper will be applicable. We will study a particular example as a case study. In particular, the question of whether partially nested dynamic LQG teams admit optimal policies under an average cost criterion, in its most general form, has not been conclusively addressed despite the presence of results which impose linearity apriori for the optimal policies under such information structures [36] . We hope that our solution approach can be utilized in the future to develop a complete theory for such problems. We consider a special case as an example, as we review the contributions in the following.
Contributions. Our paper has two main contributions.
(i) For a general setup of static teams, we show that, under sufficient conditions (see Theorem 3.3), optimal policies of static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers identify as a limit of a sequence of team optimal policies of static teams with N number of decision makers as N → ∞. Under a uniform integrability condition (see Remark 2), we show that if team optimal policies of decision makers i = 1, . . . , N of static teams with N number of decision makers converge uniformly in i = 1, . . . , N (see (b) in Theorem 3.3), then these policies determine team optimal policies for the static team with countably infinite number of decision makers. (ii) We establish global optimality results for mean-field teams. Toward this end, we introduce a notion of symmetrically optimal teams (see Definition 4.2) to relax sufficient conditions on optimality (see Section 4) . Under mild conditions on action spaces and observations of decision makers, through concentration of measures arguments, we show the convergence of optimal polices for symmetric mean field teams with N decision makers to the corresponding optimal policy of mean-field teams (see Section 4) . Our contribution here, to our knowledge, is the first global optimality (and not only person-by-person-optimality) result for mean-field team problems under the strict decentralization of information (that is, with no information sharing). In addition, we present an existence result of optimal policies for mean field teams under relaxed conditions on action spaces and the cost function (see Theorem 4.10). (iii) We apply our results to a number of illustrative examples: We first consider LQG and LQ (non-Gaussian) average cost problems with the state coupling (see Section 5.1 and Section 5.2). We also consider LQG average cost problems with the control coupling (see Section 5.3). In addition, we show that the team optimal policy of LQG teams with classical information structure (see Section 5.4) is obtained using the technique proposed in this paper. This is important since this result, while is well-known in the stochastic control literature, has not been investigated using static reduction proposed in [19] and hence this approach can be viewed as a step to address optimal solutions for infinite-horizon partially nested dynamic LQG problems which can be reduced to a static team with countably infinite number of decision makers. The organization of the paper is as follows. Preliminaries and the problem statement are presented in Section 2. Section 3 contains main results include sufficient conditions of team optimality and the asymptotic optimally for a general setup of static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers. Section 4 discusses symmetric and mean field teams, and applications are presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
Problem Formulation.
2.1. Preliminaries. Before presenting our main results, we introduce preliminaries following the presentation in [45] , in particular, we introduce the characterizations laid out by Witsenhausen, through his Intrinsic Model [42] ; further characterizations and classifications of information structures are introduced comprehensively in [44] . Suppose there is a predefined order in which the decision makers act. Such systems are called sequential systems. The action and measurement spaces are standard Borel spaces, that is, Borel subsets of complete, separable and metric spaces. The Intrinsic Model for sequential teams is defined as follows.
• There exists a collection of measurable spaces {(Ω, F ), (U i , U i ), (V i , V i ), i ∈ N}, specifying the system's distinguishable events, and control and measurement spaces.
In this model (described in discrete time), any action applied at any given time is regarded as applied by an individual decision maker (DM), who acts only once. The pair (Ω, F ) is a measurable space (on which an underlying probability may be defined). The pair (U i , U i ) denotes the measurable space from which the action, u i , of decision maker i is selected. The pair (V i , V i ) denotes the measurable observation/measurement space. • There is a measurement constraint to establish the connection between the observation variables and the system's distinguishable events. The V i -valued observation variables are given by
The set of admissible control laws γ = {γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . }, also called designs or policies, are measurable control functions, so that u i = γ i (v i ). Let Γ i denote the set of all admissible policies for DM i and let Γ = i Γ i . • There is a probability measure P on (Ω, F ) describing the probability space on which the system is defined. Under this intrinsic model, a sequential team problem is dynamic if the information available to at least one DM is affected by the action of at least one other DM. A team problem is static, if for every decision maker the information available is only affected by exogenous disturbances; that is no other decision maker can affect the information at any given decision maker.
Information structures can also be categorized as classical, quasi-classical or non-
). An IS which is not partially nested is nonclassical.
(P N ) Let N = |N | be the number of control actions taken, and each of these actions is taken by a different decision maker. Let γ N = {γ 1 , · · · , γ N } and let Γ N = N i Γ i space of admissible policies for the team with N DMs. Assume an expected cost function is defined as
Here, we have the notation u N := {u i , i ∈ N }. DEFINITION 2.1. Team Optimal Solution for (P N ) [44] . For a given stochastic team problem with a given information structure, a policy (strategy)
Person-by-person optimal solution [44] . For a given N -DM stochastic team with a fixed information structure, an N -tuple of strategies γ * N := (γ 1 * , . . . , γ N * ) constitutes a person-by-person optimal (pbp optimal) solution for (P N ) if, for all β ∈ Γ i and all i ∈ N , the following inequalities hold:
where (γ −i * N , β) := (γ 1 * , . . . , γ (i−1) * , β, γ (i+1) * , . . . , γ N * ).
To simplify notations, let for any 1 ≤ k ≤ N , γ −k N := {γ i , i ∈ {1, · · · , N } \ {k}}. DEFINITION 2.3. Stationary solution [35] . A team decision rule γ N (.) is stationary if J(γ N ) < ∞, and for all i = 1, ..., N , P-almost surely
where E ω|v i is the conditional expectation of ω given v i , and ∇ u i denotes the gradient with respect to u i . In this subsection, without abuse of notations, we sometimes used γ i as γ i (v i ). In the following, we present some related existing results for static teams with N decision makers. The following is known as Radner's theorem [35] . Radner proposed the first result to connect the stationarity concept and global team optimality. Note that Radner considered the static team.
N is stationary; then γ * N is globally optimal for (P N ). Radner's theorem fails in some applications because of the restrictive local finiteness assumption. Krainak et al [26] relaxed assumptions and presented sufficient conditions for team optimality for static teams.
Since the set of admissible policies is generally uncountable, checking (2.3) is difficult. Krainak et al [26] further developed relaxed conditions under which stationarity of a team decision rule implies its optimality. Radner used local finiteness to establish such a result, but local finiteness is restrictive. THEOREM 2.6.
[26] Assume, for every fixed ω ∈ Ω, that c(ω, u N ) is a convex differentiable function of u N and assume that,
Then γ * N is a team optimal policy for (P N ). If c(ω, u N ) is strictly convex in u N , P-a.s., then γ * N is unique.
Furthermore, (2.4) can be replaced by the following more checkable conditions [44] : Let Γ i be Hilbert space for each i = 1, ..., N and E(c(ω, γ N (v N ))) < ∞ for all γ N ∈ Γ N . Moreover, let
The above conditions follows directly from (2.4) when Γ i is a Hilbert space for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . This condition can be checked for some applications; for example, LQ teams [44] .
2.2. Problem statement. (P ∞ ) Consider a team with countably infinitely many decision makers. Let Γ = i∈N Γ i be a countable but an infinite product policy space. We assume U i = R n , and V i = R m for all i ∈ N, where n and m are positive integers. Let c : Ω × R n × R n → R + , and the expected cost be
For a given stochastic team problem with a given information structure, a policy γ * :
Our goal in this paper is to establish conditions for a team policy to be optimal, and also conncet the optimal cost and policies for (P ∞ ) and (P N ). To this end, we re-define (P N ) for our problem statement as follows:
(P N ) Let N = |N | be the number of control actions taken and γ N = {γ 1 , · · · , γ N } and let Γ N = N i Γ i space of admissible policies for the team with N DMs. Assume an expected cost function is defined as
We will investigate the relations between the sequence of solutions to (2.7) and the solution to (2.6).
3.
Optimal policies for teams with infinitely many decision makers.
3.1. Sufficient conditions of optimality. In the following, we propose sufficient conditions of team optimality for (P ∞ ). We often follow [26] , and the result is an extension of [26] to a general setup of static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers. We also note a related analysis in [30] . We will use the following theorem for LQ static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers (see Section 5.2).
be a R + -valued jointly convex function of second and third arguments and differentiable in u i with continuous partial derivatives, for every ω ∈ Ω.
, then γ * is a globally optimal team policy for (P ∞ ). Proof. We use the convexity property to justify interchanging the expectation and the derivation similar to [26, Theorem 2], then we use (3.1) and (3.2) to establish the global optimality of γ * for (P ∞ ). Under (A1), we have for every α ∈ (0, 1],
Hence, [11, Proposition 6.3.2] implies that h ω N (α) is a monotone non-increasing function as α → 0 and bounded from above by h ω N (1). Thus, by [11, Corollary 6.3.3], h ′ +,N (ω, 0) := lim α→0 h ω N (α) exists. Since h ω N (α) is a monotonic non-increasing function as α → 0 and bounded above by h ω N (1), and since J(γ * ) and J(γ) are finite, we can choose N large enough such that E(h ω N (1)) < ∞. Now, we can use the monotone convergence theorem (see [18, page. 170]) to interchange the limit and the expectation
Thus, we can write
where (3.5) follows from (A2) and (3.1), and − lim inf Finally, the last inequality follows from (3.2); hence, J(γ) − J(γ * ) ≥ 0, and the proof is completed.
In some applications, (3.2) can be difficult to check since it must be satisfied for all γ ∈ Γ with J(γ) < ∞. In the next section, we address this issue by introducing a constructive approach for static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers as a limit of a sequence of team optimal policies of the corresponding static teams with finite number of decision makers. In the following, we propose sufficient conditions to approximate the optimal cost and a team optimal policy for static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers using the optimal cost and an optimal policy for static teams with N decision makers. We note that our first result here is based on [30, Theorem 1], which considered an equality. THEOREM 3.2. Let γ * N ∈ Γ N be an optimal policy for (P N ) as (2.7) (see [26, 17, 45] 
then γ * is a globally team optimal policy for (P ∞ ). Proof. We have
where µ = N p=1 u p and (3.9) follows from (3.8), and (3.10) is true since γ * N is a team optimal policy for (P N ) (see (2.7) ). Furthermore, (3.11) follows from the fact that [γ| N :
The above theorem and remark will be useful for some applications (see for example Section 5.4).
3.2. Asymptotically optimal policies as a limit of finite team optimal policies. In the following, we present a sufficient condition for (3.8) . The following result also presents a constructive method to obtain optimal policies using asymptotic analysis.
where || · || is the sup norm, (c) there exists a P-integrable function g(ω, v) such that, for every N ,
then γ * , a team optimal policy for (P ∞ ), is a pointwise limit of γ * N , an optimal policy for
where µ * N = 1 N N p=1 γ p * N (v p ) and the second inequality follows from Fatou's Lemma (since the cost function is non-negative). In the following, we justify the equality above. On a set of P measure one, for every fixed v i in this set, define v = (v 1 , v 2 , ...) and v N = (v 1 , . . . , v N ). We follow three steps to prove the theorem.
Step 1. We show that on a set of P measure one, for every fixed v i in this set lim
δ ω,v N = 0 P-almost surely. We have P-almost surely,
µ * ∞ ) P-a.s. for every i = 1. . . . , N .
Step 2. We show that c(ω, γ i *
By continuity of the cost function, we have for a given ǫ ω,v N > 0, there exists δ ω,v N > 0 such that
Step 3. Now, we show that lim
Following from (c), we can interchange the limit and the integral using the dominated convergence theorem, and the proof is completed. REMARK 2. One can relax conditions in the Theorem 3.3 as follows: (i) relax (a) by considering a sequence of ǫ N -optimal policy, where ǫ N are non-negative and converges to zero as N → ∞, (ii) relax (c) with a uniform integrability condition which is satisfied if the following expression is finite (see [5, Theorem 3.5] ),
for some ǫ > 0. This new condition can be checked in some applications (see Section 5) . The result follows from [5, Theorem 3.5 ], (iii) relax the P-almost sure convergence in (b) by considering convergence in probability, i.e.,
hence similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, Step 1, using continuous mapping theorem (see for example, [5, page 20] ), we can show that c(ω,
Similarly, the result of Step 2 holds in probability. Using [5, Theorem 3.5] , under the uniform integrablity of
, we can conclude E(X N ) → E(X). This relaxation can be useful when the weak law of large numbers can be invoked to check (c), but the strong law of large numbers fails to apply. We apply the results of this section to two examples in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. In the following section, we show that under symmetry of optimal policies, sufficient conditions of optimality can be satisfied quite effortlessly.
Globally Optimal Policies for Mean-Field Teams.
4.1. Symmetric teams. In the following, we present sufficient conditions for team optimality in symmetric and mean field teams. The concept of symmetric has been studied in a variety of contexts; see e.g., [33] , [10] and many others. We note that it is also said to be totally symmetric in a game theoretic context (see for example [10] ). DEFINITION 4.2. (Symmetrically optimal teams) A team is symmetrically optimal if there exist an identically symmetric policy (i.e., each DM has the same optimal policy).
In the following, we characterize the symmetry of the general setup for the (P N ) (see (2.1)) defined in Section 2.1. Clearly, the result will also hold for the (P N ) (see (2.7)) defined in Section 2.2. First, we recall the definition of exchangeable finite sequence of random variables. DEFINITION 4.3. Random variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N are exchangeable if any permutation, σ, of the sequence fails to change the joint probability measures of random variables, i.e., P(dx σ(1) , dx σ(2) , . . . , dx σ(N ) ) = P(dx 1 , dx 2 , . . . , dx N ).
Let
where we define ω 0 as the cost function relevant exogenous variable and is contained in ω.
LEMMA 4.4. For a fixed N , consider a N -DM team defined as (P N ) (see (2.1)) and let the cost function be a convex function of u N . Assume the cost function is symmetric with respect to the actions, i.e., for any permutation of indexes, σ, P-almost surely c(ω 0 , u 1 , . . . , u N ) = c(ω 0 , u σ(1) , . . . , u σ(N ) ). If U is convex, and observations of DMs are exchangeable condition on ω 0 , then the team is symmetrically optimal.
Proof. Any permutation of policies does not deviate the value of J N (γ N ) since
where (4.1) follows from the assumption that the cost function is symmetric with respect to the actions, and the hypothesis that observations of DMs are exchangeable condition on ω 0 . Let γ * N = (γ 1 * , γ 2 * , . . . , γ N * ) be a team optimal policy for (P N ) (see (2.1)). Considerγ N as a convex combination of all possible permutations of policies by averaging them, σ ∈ Σ, where Σ is the set of all possible permutation. Since U is convex,γ N is a control policy. Following from convexity of the cost function, we have for σ∈Σ α σ = 1,
where the inequality follows from convexity of the cost function for every fixed realization of observations since we have
where (γ * ,σ N ) j denotes the j-the component of γ * ,σ N , and the inequality above follows from Jensen's inequality since the cost function is convex. Hence,γ N is team optimal and the team is symmetrically optimal.
In the following, we present one characterization of symmetrically optimal teams; this looks to be a standard result; however, a proof is included for completeness since we could not find an explicit reference. LEMMA 4.5. For a fixed N , consider a N -DM team defined as (P N ) (see (2.1)) and let the cost function be a convex function of u N . Assume the set of action space for each DM is convex. If the expected cost function ((2.1)) is symmetric with respect to the policies, then the team is symmetrically optimal.
Proof. Let γ * N = (γ 1 * , γ 2 * , . . . , γ N * ) be a team optimal policy for (P N ) (see (2.1)). According to the definition of symmetric teams, any permutation of policies, sayγ * N = (γ i1 * , γ i2 * , . . . , γ iN * ), fails to change the value of the expected cost function, and hencê γ * N is team optimal for (P N ) (see (2.1)). Considerγ N as a uniform randomization among all possible permutations of optimal policies, since U is convex thenγ N is a control policy. By convexity of the cost function, through Jensen's inequality, and the fact that any permutation of optimal policies preserves the value of the cost function, we have J N (γ N ) ≤ J N (γ * N ). Since γ * N is team optimal for (P N ) (see (2.1)),γ N is also team optimal for (P N ) (see (2.1)) which is also identically symmetric, and this completes the proof. THEOREM 4.6. Consider a N -DM team defined as (P N ) (see (2.7)) in Section 2.2. Let action spaces be convex and the cost function be convex in the second and third arguments. If observations are exchangeable condition on ω, then the team is symmetrically optimal.
Proof. The cost function defined in (P N ) (see (2.7)) is symmetric in actions, hence under convexity of the action spaces and the cost function and following from the hypothesis that observations are exchangeable condition on ω, the proof is completed using Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5.
Theorem 4.6 will be utilized in our analysis to follow.
4.2.
Optimal solutions for mean-field teams as limits of optimal policies for finite symmetric teams. In the following, we present some results for symmetrically optimal static teams. First, we focus on the case that the observations of decision makers are identical and independent, then we deal with non-identical and dependent observations under additional assumptions. As we noted earlier, mean field games studied in [15] belong to this class in a game theoretic context; in [15] concentration of measures arguments and independence of measurements have been utilized to justify the convergence of equilibria (person-by-personoptimality in the team setup). We also note that [25] and [32] have considered symmetry conditions for mean field games. In the context of LQ mean field teams, [1] has considered a setup where DMs share the mean field in the system either completely or partially (through showing that a centralized performance can be attained under the restricted information structure), and [24] has studied a continuous-time setup with a major agent.
Our first theorem, under the assumption that observations are independent and identically distributed, utilizes a measure concentration argument to establish a convergence result. THEOREM 4.7. Consider a team defined as (P ∞ ) (see (2.6) ) with the convex cost func-tion in the second and third arguments. Let the action space be compact and convex for each decision maker, and v i s be i.i.d. random variables. If there exists a sequence of optimal policies for (P N ) (see (2.7)), {γ * N } N , which converges (for every decision maker due to symmetry) pointwise to γ * ∞ as N → ∞, then γ * ∞ (which is identically symmetric) is an optimal policy for (P ∞ ).
Proof. We show (3.8) holds, then we invoke Theorem 3.2. Action spaces and the cost function are convex and following from the hypothesis that v i s are i.i.d. random variables (hence they are exchangeable condition on ω) and the result of Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.6, one can consider a sequence of N -DM teams which are symmetrically optimal that define (P N ) (see (2.7)) and whose limit is identified with
where we denote C b (X) as the space of continuous and bounded functions in X, we have converges P-almost sure weakly to Q ω = δ E(ζ i ∞ ) in the space of probability measures in Z, P(Z), that is | gdQ ω N − gdQ ω | converges to zero P-almost surely for every g ∈ C b (Z). Hence, through choosing a suitable subsequence, Q ω N k converges weakly to Q ω since for every continuous and bounded function g, we have P-a.s., 
where the first inequality follows from the definition of Q w N and replacing limsup by liminf. The second inequality follows from Fatou's lemma. In the following, we justify (4.6). Since 
where the first inequality follows from the definition of G M N and the second equality is true using [39, Theorem 3.5] since G M N is bounded (hence is uniformly Q ω N -integrable) and continuously converges to G M , and the monotone convergence theorem implies the last equality. Hence, (4.6) holds which implies (3.8) , and the proof is completed using Theorem 3.2. REMARK 3. The proof above reveals that if P-almost surely the sequence Q w N converges weakly to Q w , then Theorem 4.7 can be generalized to a class of team problems defined as (P ∞ ) (see (2.6) ) which may include ones with a non-convex cost function and/or the ones with conditionally non-exchangeable observations: This relaxation contains a class of problems (see e.g. Example 4 in Section 5.3.1) where one can consider a sequence of N -DM teams which admits asymmetric optimal policies that define (P N ) (see (2.7)), but whose limit is identified with (P ∞ ) under an optimal sequence of policies.
In the following, we relax the hypothesis that observations of decision makers are independent. PROPOSITION 4.8 . Consider a team defined as (P ∞ ) (see (2.6) ) with the convex cost function in the second and third arguments. Let the action space be compact and convex for each decision maker, and v i = h(x, z i ), where z i s are i.i.d. random variables. If there exists a sequence of optimal policies for (P N ) (see (2.7)), {γ * N } N , which converges to γ * ∞ as N → ∞, then γ * ∞ (which is identically symmetric) is an optimal policy for (P ∞ ). Proof. By the hypothesis, z i s are i.i.d. random variables, hence observations, v i = h(x, z i ), have identical distributions (but are not independent), and similar to the proof of Theorem 4.7, using symmetry one can show (4.4) holds. In the following, we show (4.5) and (4.6) hold.
, v 1 ), and (4.7) follows from Chebyshev's inequality, and (4.8) follows from the law of iterated expectations. The structure v i = h(x, z i ) implies conditional independence of v i s given x and E(L(γ * ∞ (v i ), v i )|x) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N , hence (4.9) is true, and using the law of iterated expectations and since g ∈ C b (Z), we have (4.10), and this impliesQ ω N k converges P-almost sure weakly to Q ω as k → ∞, hence through choosing a suitable subsequence, Q ω N k l converges P-almost sure weakly to Q ω as l → ∞ and the rest of the proof to justify (4.6) is the same as that of Theorem 4.7.
REMARK 4. Existence of optimal policies for (P N ) and dynamic teams satisfying static reduction have been studied in [43] and [17] . In [43, Theorem 4.8] , the existence of optimal policies achieved under σ-compactness of each decision maker's action space and under mild conditions on the control law and the cost function. Hence the existence of identically symmetric optimal policies for (P N ) (see (2.7)) follows from symmetry and [43, Theorem 4.8] ; thus, the existence result for (P ∞ ) is obtained under assumptions of Theorem 4.7.
In the following, action spaces need not be compact; this is particularly important for LQG models as we will see in the next section. THEOREM 4.9. Consider a team defined as (P ∞ ) (see (2.6) ) with the convex cost function in the second and third arguments. Let the action spaces be convex for each decision maker. Let v i s be i.i.d. random variables. If there exists a sequence of optimal policies for (P N ) (see (2.7)), {γ * N } N , which converges to γ * ∞ as N → ∞, and (A3) for some δ > 0, sup
∞ (which is identically symmetric) is an optimal policy for (P ∞ ). Proof. In the following, we just show U uQ ω N (du × V) → U uQ ω (du × V) for P almost all ω ∈ Ω, and the rest of the proof follows from that of Theorem 4.7. We have
where (4.11) follows from Markov inequality and the triangle inequality, and (4.12) is true since observations have identical distributions, and (4.13) follows from uniform integrability assumption (A3) and using [5, Theorem 3.5 ]. On the other hand, SLLN implies P-almost × V) , and this completes the proof.
In the following, we present a result for monotone mean field coupled teams. THEOREM 4.10. Consider a team defined as (P ∞ ) (see (2.6) ) with the convex cost function in the second and third arguments. Let the action spaces be convex for each decision maker. Let the cost function be increasing in the last argument, and v i s be i.i.d. random variables. If there exists a sequence of optimal policies for (P N ), {γ * N } N (see (2.7) ), which converges to γ * ∞ then γ * ∞ as N → ∞ (which is identically symmetric) is an optimal policy for (P ∞ ).
Proof. We show (3.8) holds, then we invoke Theorem 3.2. We use the same definitions in Theorem 4.7 for measures Q w N and Q w . We have V) , and continuity and the hypothesis that the cost is increasing in the last argument imply lim inf
for Palmost all ω ∈ Ω and u ∈ U, and this completes the proof.
In the following, observations need not be identical or independent. THEOREM 4.11. Consider a team defined as (P ∞ ) (see (2.6) ) with the convex cost function in the second and third arguments. Let the action spaces be convex for each decision maker. Let (a), and (c) in Theorem 3.3 hold. Assume there exists a sequence {γ * N (v i )} N converges to γ * ∞ (v i ) for every v i fixed in the set P measure one as N → ∞, and let P-a.s.
Then, a team optimal policy for (P ∞ ) is identically symmetric and is identified as a limit of a sequence of team optimal policies for (P N ) (see (2.7) ) as N → ∞.
Proof. Equivalent to (b) in Theorem 3.3, we can show that lim
where the last inequality follows from (4.16). Hence, thanks to Theorem 3.3, a team optimal policy for (P ∞ ) is the limit of a sequence of team optimal policies for (P N ) (see (2.7)) symmetric teams as N → ∞, and hence a team optimal policy for (P ∞ ) is identically symmetric and the proof is completed.
4.
3. An existence theorem on globally optimal policies for mean-field team problems. An implication of our analysis is the following existence result on globally optimal policies for mean-field problems. In Theorem 4.7, we showed that if a pointwise limit of N → ∞ of a sequence of optimal policies for (P N ) (see (2.7)) exists, this limit is a globally optimal policy for (P ∞ ), but under the conditions stated in the following theorem, an existence result also can be established. In the following, we relax the assumption that there exists a pointwise convergence sequence of optimal policies for (P N ) (see (2.7) ). For the following theorem, we do not establish the pointwise convergence; but clearly if a sequence of optimal policies for (P N ) (see (2.7)) converges pointwise, a global optimal policy exists.
Consider the (P ∞ ) (see (2.6) ) with the convex cost function in the second and third arguments. Let the action spaces be convex for each decision maker. Assume further that, U = ∪ l K l for a countable collection of compact sets K l (i.e., U is σ-compact) and without any loss, the control laws can be restricted to those with E(φ i (u i )) ≤ K for some finite K, where φ i : U → R + is lower semi-continuous and satisfies lim
If v i s are i.i.d. random variables, then there exists an optimal policy for (P ∞ ).
Proof. We show (3.8) holds, then we invoke Theorem 3.2. Action spaces and the cost function are convex and following from the hypothesis that v i s are i.i.d. random variables (hence they are exchangeable) and the result of Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.6, one can consider a sequence of N -DM teams which are symmetrically optimal that define (P N ) (see (2.7)) and whose limit is identified with (P ∞ ). DefineQ ω n (B) := 1 n n i=1 1 ζ i ∈B , where ζ i := (γ * (v i ), v i ) and γ * is the limit of a convergent subsequence {γ * n } n . Since v i s are i.i.d. random variables, and following from symmetry, for every continuous and bounded function g, we have P-a.s.,
where the result follows from the similar argument of that of Theorem 4.7 to justify (4.5).
Hence, there exists a subsequence {Q ω n } n∈I converges weakly to Q ω where I is the index set of a convergent subsequence. Now, we invoke Theorem 3.2, hence we just need to show (3.8) holds. We have
where (4.17) follows from the monotone convergence theorem and (4.18) is true since {Q w n } n∈I converges weakly to Q w , and U uQ ω n (du × V) → U uQ ω (du × V) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω, since the space of control policies is weakly compact (see e.g., [43, proof of Theorem 4.7] ). Hence (4.18) follows from [39, Theorem 3.5] since min{M, c ω, u, U uQ ω n (du × V) } is non-negative, bounded and continuously converges in u and that is because the cost function is continuous in u, and min{M, c(ω, u n , U u n Q ω n (du × V))} → min{M, c(ω, u, U uQ ω (du × V))} where u n → u as n → ∞. Equality (4.19) follows from the dominated convergence theorem since min{M, c ω, u, U uQ ω n (du × V) } is bounded, and (4.20) is true since limsup is the greatest convergent subsequence limit for a bounded sequence. Finally, (4.21) follows from the definition of emprical measures and since for every M , min{M, c ω, u, U uQ ω N (du × V) } ≤ c ω, u, U uQ ω N (du × V) ; hence, (3.8) holds, and Q ω induces the global optimal cost for (P ∞ ). Moreover, Q ω (du × V) = Law(γ * (v i )) P-almost surely, where γ * is an optimal policy for (P ∞ ).
We apply the results of this section in Section 5.3.
Examples.
In the following, we present a number of examples to demonstrate results in previous sections. First, we consider LQG and LQ static teams with coupling between states, then we consider LQG symmetric static teams with coupling between control actions. Moreover, we investigate dynamic infinite-horizon average cost LQG teams with the classical information structure.
Example 1, Static quadratic Gaussian teams with coupling between states.
Consider the following observation scheme,
The expected cost function is defined as 2) where µ N := 1 N N k=1 x k and let R be a positive number and Q be a non-negative number. THEOREM 5.1. For LQG static teams as formulated above, under the measurement scheme (5.1), γ i * ∞ (v i ) is globally optimal for (P ∞ ) achieved as the limit N → ∞ of γ i * N (v i ), an optimal solution for (P N ).
Proof. We invoke Theorem 3.3 to prove the theorem. The stationary policy (see Definition 2.3) is obtained as
where the equality follows from the assumption that x i s are independent of z i s and x k s, k = i for every i = 1, 2, ..., N and they are mean zero. Following [26] , stationary policies are team optimal for (P N ) in this formulation. We have, γ i * ∞ (v i ) = (R + Q) −1 QE(x i |v i ). Following from the assumption that v i s are zero mean Gaussian random variables, we have
where Σ XY is defined as a covariance of two random variables X and Y . We have P-almost surely, 
is globally optimal for (P ∞ ) and is obtained as a limit of γ k * N (v k ) as N → ∞. Proof. In the following, we use both Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.3. Clearly, (A1) holds, we show that (A2) holds, 
where measurability of m k := γ k ∞ (v k ) − γ k * ∞ (v k ) with respect to the σ-field generated by v k implies (5.7), and (5.8) follows from the iterated expectations property. Since x p s are mean zero and independent of v k for k = p, we have (5.9), and (5.10) follows from the fact that γ k * ∞ is independent of k by definition, and since v k and x k are i.i.d. random variables.
and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies (5.11), and (5.12) follows from
2) is satisfied and Theorem 3.1 completes the proof. One can also invoke Theorem 3.3 to complete the proof. One can show that the condition in Remark 2(ii) holds since v i s and x i s are i.i.d. random variables. We only justify (b). Stationary policy is team optimal for (P N ) in this formulation [26] , hence
Equivalently, we can show that
where the first inequality is true since E(x i |v i ) 2 s are non-negative, and equality follows from SLLN since
and (E x i |v i ) 2 are i.i.d. sequence of random variables since v i s are i.i.d. random variables and the proof is completed.
Example 3, LQG symmetric teams with coupling between control actions. Let
where {z i } i∈N is independent sequence of zero mean Gaussian random vectors also independent of x, with covariance Σ jj = N 0 > 0. Define ω = (x, z), where x is a Gaussian random vector with covariance E(xx T ) = Σ 00 . Let
where R is an appropriate dimension positive definite matrix and D, and Q are appropriate dimension positive semi-definite matrices, and R > 2D. In the following, we follow steps in [44, Theorem 2.6.8] to obtain optimal policies for (P N ). LEMMA 5.3. Consider N -DM LQG team formulated above, under the measurement scheme (5.14) . Then, the global optimal policy for (P N ) is linear, i.e., γ k * N (v k ) = π k N v k . Here, π k N ∈ M n,m (R), n × m real-valued matrix, is obtained by solving the following parallel update scheme, Note that P is a projection operator defined on a Hilbert space whose operator norm is one. Now, we use the successive approximation method [44, Theorem A.6.4 ]. According to (5.17) , ||Ax|| and ρ denotes spectral radius. The first equality is true since both P and A maps Γ N into itself and P has operator norm equal to one. The above constraint can be always satisfied by choosing ǫ = 1 2 (λ max (R) + λ min (R)). On the other hand, since (x, z 1 , . . . , z N ) is jointly Gaussian, then γ k * N (v k ) = π k N v k for k = 1, . . . , N . Hence, γ k * N,(i) (v k ) = π k N,(i) v k , and by linearity of the conditional expectation, we have E(x|v k ) = S k v k , and E(γ p * N (v p )|v k ) = π p N H p S k v k . Hence (5.16) holds. Following [44] , the stationary policy is globally team optimal for (P N ), and this completes the proof. THEOREM 5.4. Consider (P ∞ ) with the cost (5.15) . Under the following measurement scheme
where z i s are i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors, γ i * ∞ (v i ) = π * ∞ v i is an optimal control law for (P ∞ ) and is the point-wise limit of γ i * N (v i ) = π * N v i , an optimal control law for (P N ). Proof. In the following, we invoke Proposition 4.8 and Theorem 4.9 to prove the theorem. Under (5.18), the static team is symmetrically optimal and hence from (5.16), we have π * N = L N [S + N −1 (N − 1)π * N HS], π * ∞ = R −1 D[S + π * ∞ HS], where L N = (N 2 R − 2DN + Q) −1 (N 2 D − N Q), S = Σ 00 (H) T (HΣ 00 (H) T + Σ kk ) −1 . Since for every N , we have J N (γ * N ) < ∞, and since R > 0, we have sup N ≥1 E(||γ * N (v 1 )|| 2 2 + ||γ * ∞ (v 1 )|| 2 2 ) < ∞, which implies (A3). The proof is completed using the results of Proposition 4.8 and Theorem 4.9. One can also invoke Theorem 4.11 to justify the result. 
where M ∈ Z + is independent of N . Clearly, the N -DM team admits asymmetric optimal policies for P N with the expected cost J N for every N . However, one can observe that the last term above goes to zero as N → ∞ under a sequence of optimal policies, and hence asymptotically the expected cost would essentially be (5.15) and Theorem 5.1 implies γ * ∞ is an optimal policy since P-almost surely the sequence Q w N converges weakly to Q w (the asymmetric term vanishes when N → ∞). That is, the optimal policy designed for the symmetric problem is also the solution for the asymmetric problem, since under this policy the additional term (which is a non-negative contribution) vanishes, certifying its optimality.
Example 5, Multivariable classical
Linear Quadratic Gaussian problems: Average cost optimality through static reduction. Here, we revisit a well-known problem and a well-known solution, using the technique presented in this paper. Let
where A ∈ M n,n (R), B ∈ M n,m (R) and w t s and X 0 are i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors with mean zero and positive variance taking values in R n . Let (A, B) be controllable and let J(γ) = lim sup
